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INTRODUCTION
Political trust—trust in government and democracy—has been
declining across the democratic world for several decades.1 This
phenomenon is especially pronounced in the United States, where
it is accompanied by a fall in social trust—trust in society generally.
Collapsing trust is arguably connected to increasing American
political polarization, perhaps as both cause and effect. We can see
the causal arrows running in both directions: low trust in
government increases polarization, and high polarization
decreases trust in government. When people mistrust government,
they will resent government more and support and obey it less.
They will also refuse to believe important governmental messages.
They will see those messages as lies or as based on a desire to
control the populace. Those who support the government, by
contrast, will act more cooperatively. This will create cleavages
between different political groups. Unfortunately, COVID-19 has
made failures of political trust palpable and tragic. People die

* Kevin Vallier is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green
State University.
1. Jacques Thomassen, Rudy Andeweg & Carolien van Ham, Political Trust and the
Decline of Legitimacy Debate: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation into Their Interrelationship,
in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST 509, 509–25 (Sonja Zmerli & Tom W.G. van der Meer
eds., 2017). But see MYTH AND REALITY OF THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS: EXPLAINING TRENDS AND
CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ESTABLISHED DEMOCRACIES (Carolien van Ham, Jacques
Thomassen, Kees Aarts & Rudy Andeweg eds., 2017).
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refusing COVID-19 vaccines on the grounds that the government
officials who push for vaccination cannot be trusted. Perhaps
officials have contaminated the vaccine or want to take away
individual liberty. Other political groups have eagerly defended
the vaccine. Each side sees the other as behaving badly, creating
suspicion on both sides of the political aisle. Similarly, an already
polarized population will tend to trust government less when the
other party is in power; some will distrust government so much
that they will not believe that the election was legitimate.
Tragically, we saw political distrust unfold on January 6th, 2021.
The problem of political trust is pressing.
To put it plainly, political and legal philosophers should study
political trust. Its decline creates political instability and political
polarization, both of which threaten social cooperation. If legal
philosophers hope to understand what makes societies stable,
cooperative, and just, they must study political trust. Perhaps good
legal philosophy can identify the institutions best suited to create
trust across the political divide. We might thereby contain the
damaging social consequences of deep disagreement.
Towards this end, I hope to introduce an attractive conception
of political trust into political and legal philosophy. Both areas have
so far largely ignored trust at the institutional level. I will base my
account of political trust on the empirical work on its causes and
consequences. This Article develops a definition of political trust
that matches our intuitions about trust, one that also fits the
extensive literature on political trust found in the social sciences.
With an intuitive, yet scientifically respectable, conception of
political trust, philosophers and legal theorists can learn about
political trust from that literature. Here I draw on my two recent
books on this topic, Must Politics Be War? and Trust in a Polarized
Age. This Article focuses on the concept of political trust in those
works. It provides a standalone account of political trust as a way
to frame the continuing trust literature. A standalone essay on
political trust will help the reader follow and understand the
literature as it develops.
Political trust, I argue, is a subset of social trust, which in turn
is a subset of interpersonal trust. My argument uses tools
philosophers developed to analyze interpersonal trust. However,
to show that political trust is a kind of trust, we need analyses of
interpersonal trust and social trust. This requires that I introduce
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several concepts. I thus build an account of political trust from more
rudimentary components.
I outline a descriptive notion of political trust, an account that
reveals how we understand trust. I am not trying to determine
when our trust is justified or appropriate. To accomplish the latter
task, we must tie trust to trustworthiness, since trustworthiness
justifies trust. But I will not develop an account of political
trustworthiness here.
Part I develops an account of interpersonal trust. Part II
explains social trust as trust that most people will comply with
salient social norms. Part III defines political trust as social trust that
governmental officials will follow institutional norms. These norms
demand that officials produce desired outcomes. Part IV reviews
how social and political trust are understood and measured in the
empirical literature. It also addresses some challenges to that
literature. I also review the empirical literature on the causes and
consequences of political trust. Part V outlines the significance of
political trust for political and legal philosophy.
I. TRUST
In this section I will understand trust as a three-place relation.
A trusts B to engage in some line of conduct only if A depends on B
to follow it. A also believes that B acts from moral concern or regard,
rather than merely prudential or strategic reason. I outline each
component going forward.
Russell Hardin argues that trust is a three-place relation: A
trusts B to Φ.2 To trust another, then, implies that the truster expects
the trustee to engage in some line of conduct.3 Those who trust must
think that trustees are willing or disposed to do what the trusters
trust them to do. Second, trust requires thinking that the trustee is
competent to perform the action we trust her to perform.4 As Annette
Baier has argued, “Trust . . . is reliance on others’ competence and
willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares about
which are entrusted to their care.”5 For John to trust Reba, then,
2. RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS 9, 13 (2004).
3. I use the term “trustee” to denote the person who is trusted to engage in some line
of conduct. A “truster” trusts the trustee to engage in that line of conduct.
4. HARDIN, supra note 2, at 8.
5. Annette Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 259 (1986). See also Karen Jones,
Trust as an Affective Attitude, 107 ETHICS 4, 4 (1996); Amy Mullin, Trust, Social Norms, and
Motherhood, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 316, 322 (2005).
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John must possess a “competence” belief.6 Third, if John trusts
Reba, he must be vulnerable to her or dependent upon her in some
way. In paradigmatic cases of trust, we think the truster takes
some kind of risk in trusting others. Reliance is exposure to this
risk of betrayal.7
The trust literature ubiquitously distinguishes mere reliance
from trust.8 As Karen Jones argues, “Trust[] is not an attitude that
we can adopt toward machinery. I can rely on my computer not to
destroy important documents or on my old car to get me from A to
B, but my old car is reliable rather than trustworthy.”9 Based on the
broad consensus on this point, Jeremy Wanderer and Leo
Townsend take it “for granted that there is a basic difference
between reliance and trust.”10
Philosophers have distinguished trust from mere reliance by
deploying P.F. Strawson’s familiar idea of the participant stance.11
Richard Holton argues that “the difference between trust and
reliance is that trust involves [taking] something like a participant
stance towards the person you are trusting.”12 When John takes the
participant stance with respect to Reba, he recognizes that Reba is
“a creature that acts for reasons” and he allows Reba’s reasons “to
factor into [his] thinking and support [his] beliefs and decisions.”13
Thus, John does not view Reba as an obstacle to be conquered or
avoided. He rather sees her as a moral agent he can hold
accountable for wrongful action. Immoral choices and their
associated display of ill will make the negative reactive attitudes, like
resentment, appropriate.14 We expect others to act as they know
they ought, so we can appropriately blame those who make
6. CRISTIANO CASTELFRANCHI & RINO FALCONE, TRUST THEORY: A SOCIO-COGNITIVE
12 (2010).
7. Reliance can be weak; as Holton suggests, “I do not need to have the belief that
you will do what I rely [on] you to do, but I do need to lack the belief that you will fail.”
Richard Holton, Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe, 72 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 63, 71 (1994).
8. See Baier, supra note 5, at 234.
9. Jones, supra note 5, at 14.
10. Jeremy Wanderer & Leo Townsend, Is It Rational to Trust?, 8 PHIL. COMPASS 1, 3
(2013) (emphasis added).
11. P.F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 10 (1974).
Strawson speaks of an “attitude” rather than a “stance.”
12. Holton, supra note 7, at 67. See also Wanderer & Townsend, supra note 10, at 3;
Pamela Hieronymi, The Reasons of Trust, 86 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 213, 216 (2008).
13. Hieronymi, supra note 12, at 226–27.
14. MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS
AFTER WRONGDOING 79 (2006).
AND COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
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immoral choices. The participant stance renders the reactive
attitudes appropriate and so it distinguishes trust from mere
reliance. We can therefore say that for A to trust B, A must see B as
a participant in a shared moral practice.
The truster must also think that the trustee has an adequate
moral motivation to Φ. Philosophers working on trust disagree
about how to understand this motive. Jones argues that trustees
must bear trusters “goodwill”15 while others insist that the trustee
must be thought to act from “moral integrity.”16 Philip Nickel
argues that acting from moral obligation is the right motive.17 Amy
Mullin claims that we can trust others only if we believe that they
comply with social norms.18 Colin O’Neil offers a similar point that
a trustee warrants trust when she believes in her obligations.19 And
Jones, once an advocate of the goodwill condition, claims that trustees
need only respond appropriately to “another’s dependency.”20
In my view, the goodwill condition is too vague. John can trust
Reba even if he thinks she lacks general goodwill towards others.
Or so long as he thinks Reba acts, or is generally willing to act, from
moral considerations. This does not force us to believe that Reba,
qua trustee, has significant moral integrity. Nor need we think that
she recognizes and acts upon most of her obligations. And yet both
factors bear on John’s overall judgment that Reba is trustworthy in
particular contexts.
I also reject Hardin’s “encapsulated-interest” account of trust.
Trust for Hardin includes the belief that the trustee encapsulates the
truster’s interest into her own. As Hardin describes his view, “I trust
you because your interests encapsulate mine to some extent—in
particular, because you want our relationship to continue.”21 But
we can trust those with no knowledge of our particular interests.
We can trust other citizens in large nations, or persons who interact
with us anonymously. One implication of Hardin’s position is that
trust is counterintuitively intimate. Hardin claims that “[t]rust as

15. See Jones, supra note 5, at 4.
16. See Carolyn McLeod, Our Attitude Towards the Motivation of Those We Trust, 38 S.J.
PHIL. 465, 465 (2000).
17. See Philip Nickel, Trust and Obligation-Ascription, 10 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 309, 309–16 (2007).
18. See Mullin, supra note 5, at 316.
19. See Collin O’Neil, Lying, Trust, and Gratitude, 40 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 302, 309 (2012).
20. Karen Jones, Trustworthiness, 123 ETHICS 61, 68–69 (2012).
21. HARDIN, supra note 2, at xix.
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encapsulated-interest rules out the possibility or coherence not only
of generalized trust but also of widespread trust by any
individual.”22 But this implies that social trust is incoherent by
definition, which is erroneous.
We can construe the motives characteristic of trustworthiness
as moral reasons to comply with social norms. Here I follow
Bernard Lahno and Mullin. Lahno argues that “a situation of trust
is perceived by a trusting person as one in which shared values or
norms motivate both his own actions as well as those of the person
being trusted.”23 Mullin claims we often trust strangers with whom
we have no relationship: trust is possible with “the assumption of
a shared commitment to a particular social norm.”24
Trustees must be seen as having sufficient, motivating moral
reasons to act. John does not trust Reba to Φ if he believes that she
only Φs because she fears getting caught not Φing. Nor can he trust
her if she Φs to gain John’s trust only to betray him. This intuition
tempts theorists to think that trust involves a belief in the goodwill
of another person. But we do not need to appeal to goodwill, only
that we see that the relevant norm provides the trustee with
sufficient moral reason to act. We believe the trustee “is internally
committed to a particular social norm and considers that norm to be
of significant importance in some arena of action.”25 A person is
internally committed to a social norm when she follows it because
she believes that she morally ought to follow it. Or that others think
she morally ought to follow it and she fears their sanction.
One might object that we can sometimes trust persons to follow
social norms for nonmoral reasons. We might trust someone to
do her job simply because she enjoys it. Yet moral reasons need
only be sufficient to drive norm compliance in most conditions.
Suppose that Reba acts on nonmoral reasons, but her moral reasons
remain sufficient to motivate her to comply with the norm. John
need not worry that Reba will violate the norm if her nonmoral
reasons run dry. But if Reba violates the norm when nonmoral
reasons favor violation, she is untrustworthy with respect to that
norm. Further, if John knows Reba lacks moral motivation to obey
the norm, she is similarly untrustworthy. John can rely on her, but
22. Id. at 179, 182.
23. Bernard Lahno, On the Emotional Character of Trust, 4 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL
PRAC. 171, 171 (2001).
24. Mullin, supra note 5, at 323.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
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he will not make himself generally vulnerable to Reba’s
misconduct. We do not trust even predictable psychopaths, since
we know they lack moral concern.
We can now state some necessary conditions on trust. Note that
I do not claim to specify sufficient conditions. I do this in order to
remain neutral between doxastic and non-doxastic accounts of
trust. Doxastic approaches hold that trust is a belief or a set of
beliefs, whereas non-doxastic approaches understand trust as an
attitude, affect, or stance.26 I adopt a doxastic approach insofar
as I claim that beliefs form necessary conditions on trust. But I
leave open whether trust essentially involves certain stances or
affects. My arguments do not depend on whether trust has nondoxastic elements.
We define trust as follows:
Trust: A trusts B to Φ only when A has a goal and believes (i) that
participant B’s Φing is necessary or helpful for achieving the goal
and (ii) that B is willing and able to Φ by complying with social
norm S where moral reasons are sufficient to motivate B to comply
with S.

This condition includes a social norm S. Complying with S
facilitates or requires the action Φ that A trusts B to execute.27 It also
requires that moral reasons be sufficient to motivate B to comply
with the social norm. Otherwise, we must allow that A can trust B
even when A believes B happily ignores the moral reasons that
apply to her. If A doubts B has sufficient moral motivation to comply
with S, this can eject A from the participant stance. A attends to B’s
nonmoral reasons alone.
II. SOCIAL TRUST
We now have a working account of interpersonal trust. To scale
up to social trust, we must appeal to a social norm type that I call
moral rules. To define the latter idea, let’s begin with the obvious:

26. For a doxastic account of trust, see Arnon Keren, Trust and Belief: A Preemptive
Reasons Account, 191 SYNTHESE 2593, 2598 (2014). Jones, supra note 5, and Holton, supra note
7, for instance, think of trust as a kind of affective attitude or participant stance respectively,
and not as a belief.
27. Thick forms of interpersonal trust are based on what Cristina Bicchieri has called
“schemata” or complexes of norms, which are often implicit, and can make it mistakenly
appear as though thick interpersonal trust, like friendship trust, is not mediated by social
norms. CRISTINA BICCHIERI, THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIETY 81 (2006).
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social norms are norms.28 They consist of routine social behaviors
that follow a public standard and engender normative attitudes over
time.29 People obey conventions because they believe doing so will
help them; norm-following is often less deliberate and sometimes
occurs even if a person anticipates no benefit from compliance.
I draw on Cristina Bicchieri’s account of norms. Many norms
are based on empirical expectations that the norm applies and that
others will comply with the norm. Social norms arise from
empirical expectations and normative expectations. Normative
expectations imply that people believe that everyone thinks
they ought to obey the norm. In some scenarios, social norm
violations yield social sanction. Community members mind the
norm violation. They think the sanctioned person should have
observed it.30 Bicchieri thinks normative expectations include
prudential normativity. Norm violators show themselves unwise. I
think many normative expectations have a moral character:
violations can generate public moral sanction. Upon observing
violations, people will typically blame and punish violators,
drawing on the followers’ resentment and indignation (or people
will at least anticipate blame and punishment).
Gerald Gaus extends Bicchieri’s analysis to develop the idea of
a “social-moral rule.” Social rules are construed along a
“set/subset” analysis. Rules identify “a certain set of actions” that
may, must, or must not be performed.31 Social rules “issue
directives for actions with these properties” rather than identifying
particular actions. For example, a social rule might prohibit lying,
but not identify specific acts as lies.
For Gaus, social rules have four features: “a set of persons to
whom the prescription is addressed”; “a property of actions”; “a
deontic operator such that actions with that property may, must, or
28. See Cristina Bicchieri, Ryan Muldoon & Alessandro Sontuoso, Social Norms, in
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2018); Michael Rescorla,
Convention, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2019). In
defining social norms, I do not thereby advance a social practice definition of norms such as
that found in GEOFFREY BRENNAN, LINA ERIKSSON, ROBERT E. GOODIN & NICHOLAS
SOUTHWOOD, EXPLAINING NORMS 20–21 (2016).
29. A descriptive norm implies that persons conditionally prefer to follow the norm
so long as they believe others will follow the norm. See CRISTINA BICCHIERI, NORMS IN THE
WILD: HOW TO DIAGNOSE, MEASURE, AND CHANGE SOCIAL NORMS 19 (2017).
30. BICCHIERI, supra note 27, at 11. Brennan et al. acknowledge that norms primarily
“serve the function . . . of making us accountable to one another” when we observe violations
of normative expectations or beliefs. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 15, 36.
31. GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON 123 (2011).
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must not be performed”; and a statement of the conditions under
which the deontic operator applies to the relevant actions.32 A rule
against lying will direct a set of persons not to engage in lying
actions; lying is prohibited in some social contexts. Social rules
enable publicly recognized directives. These directives require or
permit group members to choose certain behaviors in a specified
context. Social norms exist based on expectations alone, even if no
one practices them. But social rules must exist as a social practice.33
Social rules also create a practice of “reciprocal obligation.”34 We
believe that we should all follow the rule out of a sense of
reciprocity. As I follow the rule, I expect others to do likewise. They
expect the same of me. Gaus understands reciprocity as
establishing relations of mutual authority. We can authoritatively
direct one another to comply with the rules.35
Social-moral rules are then distinguished by the following
conditions: they are infused with moral emotions, they are seen as
nonconventional and categorical, they promote mutual benefit, and
they concern how we treat others, they are enforced with social
ostracism, and violations are seen as warranting punishment.36 I
shall call this kind of social norm a moral rule.
Bicchieri argues that people follow social norms solely based on
conditional preferences. They only prefer to follow the norm if they
think others will do so. On this basis, Bicchieri contrasts social and
moral norms: a “social norm is different from a shared prudential
or moral norm because it involves (socially) conditional
preferences.”37 For Bicchieri, people want to follow the moral norm
(say, a norm that prohibits harming others) no matter what. Moral
norms are categorical, for “one’s personal moral convictions are the
primary motivator of one’s actions, and such convictions
overwhelm any social considerations.”38 Geoffrey Brennan, Lina
Eriksson, Robert Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood insist on a similar
distinction: “Moral norms are clusters of unconditional normative
32. Id.
33. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 54–56 (3d ed. 2012). Here I distinguish a
social rule from what Brennan et al. describe as a reductive account of norms, which
characterizes norms in purely non-normative terms. See BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 15.
Rules are defined in part by the presence of normative expectations or normative attitudes.
34. GAUS, supra note 31, at 171.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 172–73.
37. BICCHIERI, supra note 27, at 72.
38. Id. at 31.

1283

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:4 (2022)

judgments, whereas social norms are clusters of conditional
normative judgments.”39 Moral norms are “practice-independent”
whereas social norms are “practice-dependent.”40
These views threaten my account of trust because I define moral
rules as a social norm. Gaus resolves the problem by reinterpreting
the idea of a conditional preference. For if there are low
expectations that people will follow the rule, Gaus argues that “this
undermines the belief that a reciprocal structure of obligation is in
fact recognized in the group.”41 So people follow moral rules
conditionally: if the rule were not in effect, people would not
recognize reciprocal obligations.42 We can likewise sidestep
Brennan et al.’s contrast between social and moral norms with a
“social-moral” norm. For Brennan et al., moral norms are strictly
personal, whereas social norms are interpersonal, but not moral.
But we can allow that some moral norms are interpersonal, even if
we follow them conditionally.
On this basis, then, moral rules are constituted by (a) empirical
expectations that persons generally comply with the rule and
(b) normative expectations that people believe that others think
they should follow the rules.43 The normative expectations appeal to
(c) a moral (rather than a prudential) “ought” that (d) establishes a
practice of reciprocal obligation. Finally, (e) violations of the rule
typically evoke, and are thought to evoke, negative reactive
attitudes. Violations may also evoke blame and punishment.
Social trust is trust that is mass and mutual: community
members place it in all or almost all community members. Large
societies typically lack shared goals of substance. So social trust
only implies that people believe others are necessary or important
to achieve each person or group’s diverse ends. Further, people
signal their ability and willingness to act in certain ways by
following moral rules. Critically, social trust does not depend on
the belief that people will follow only one moral rule. It refers to a
broad range of moral rules. Social trust, therefore, carries a generic

39. BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 61.
40. Id. at 59.
41. GAUS, supra note 31, at 171.
42. In this sense, then, the norms are practice-dependent in that if the norms did not
exist, people would not believe that the associated obligations exist, but people do not
generally believe that moral norms are practice-dependent in the way that conventions are.
I thank Brock Mason for this point.
43. That is, it is commonly believed that everyone should follow the rule.
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expectation that members of society will comply with moral rules.
Social trust need not require an affective state of security that others
will act appropriately. Rather, social trust requires that we believe
that most others will abide by a large set of “ordinary ethical rules
that are involved in the situation” 44—that is, moral rules. When we
socially trust, we believe others will choose “[e]thically justifiable
behavior”—that is, “morally correct decisions and actions based
upon ethical principles of analysis.”45 Thus, an individual trusts
members of her society in the following case:
Personal Social Trust: A socially trusts [participant] members of the
public [P1, P2 … Pn] to follow moral rules [R1, R2 … Rn] only if A
believes that [participant] members of the public are necessary or
helpful for achieving her goals and that they are generally willing
and able to do their part, knowingly or unknowingly, to achieve
those goals by complying with moral rules, where moral reasons
are sufficient to motivate compliance.

To trust his society, John must believe that other members will act
according to shared moral rules, and that these rules allow him to
reliably pursue his projects and plans.46
Social trust per se arrives if most members of the public have
these expectations:
Social Trust: a public exhibits social trust to the extent that its
participant members generally believe that other participants are
necessary or helpful for achieving one another’s goals and that
(most or all) members are generally willing and able to do their
part to achieve those goals, knowingly or unknowingly, by
following moral rules, where moral reasons are sufficient to
motivate compliance.

Societies create social trust by means of mass compliance with moral
rules.47 If we think and observe that others comply with moral rules,
the necessary empirical expectations exist. Normative
expectations backed by punishment must also be in play.
Punishment typically plays a central role in stabilizing moral

44. David M. Messick & Roderick M. Kramer, Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality, in
TRUST IN SOCIETY 89, 91 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001).
45. Larue Tone Hosmer, Trust: The Connecting Link between Organizational Theory and
Philosophical Ethics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 379, 399 (1995).
46. The person with the belief need not be aware that she holds the belief, however.
47. At least in combination with certain more ingrained traits, like personality, as we
will see below.

1285

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:4 (2022)

rules. Social trust requires a belief that people ordinarily have
adequate moral motivation to follow moral rules. They ignore
this motivation only as a moral fault.48
To enrich my account of social trust, I will contrast it with Eric
Uslaner’s well-known approach. Uslaner claims that social trust is
tied to “moralistic trust,” which involves persons believing that
“others share your fundamental moral values and therefore should
be treated as you would wish to be treated by them.”49 Social trust,
also known as generalized trust, resembles moralistic trust because
“[g]eneralized trusters see the world as a benign place with
limitless opportunities. They believe that most people share the
same fundamental values . . . .”50 Perhaps, therefore, we should
understand social trust as involving beliefs about the world in
general. Maybe social trust assesses whether humans are
fundamentally good or trustworthy. It might be a general attitude.
Yet I say social trust summarizes our beliefs that people comply
with moral rules.
However, Uslaner’s account faces difficulties. He admits that
moralistic and generalized trust do not require agreement on
central moral debates concerning religion and politics: moralistic
trusters “don’t necessarily agree with you politically or
religiously,” and “[p]lacing trust in others does not require
agreement on specific issues or even philosophies.”51 But Uslaner
waffles between describing moralistic and social trust in terms of
shared values, worldviews, or goodwill. Social trust allows for
widespread disagreement but also involves shared values and
worldviews. It is unclear, therefore, how much consensus Uslaner
thinks social trust requires. We can resolve the ambiguity by simply
replacing shared values and worldviews with a shared
preparedness to comply with moral rules. Social norms can, like
shared values, focus social agreement. Social norms can do so
between persons with considerably different religious, political,
and moral beliefs. In this way, my view merely amends Uslaner’s.
And indeed, he admits that social trust is more conditional than

48. Social trust may require punishing those who fail to punish. See ROBERT BOYD
& PETER J. RICHERSON, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF CULTURES 193–202 (2005).
49. ERIC M. USLANER, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRUST 18 (2002).
50. Id. at 79.
51. Id. at 2, 18.
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moralistic trust. And he allows that social trust can be conditional
on observed behavior.52
My view provides reason to expect social trust to be stable over
time. We socially trust when we generally believe that others can be
trusted. Social trust should not change if we observe a single moral
violation. Flouting a traffic norm will not reduce social trust. In
such cases, we might partition our trust by context: flouting traffic
norms will normally not challenge one’s belief that most people
follow most moral rules. Social trust will only decline, therefore,
when people observe widespread defection from central moral
rules. Some trust researchers think that empirical measures of social
trust show that trust does not respond to observation. But I will
argue otherwise.
III. POLITICAL TRUST
Many researchers distinguish between trust in society and trust
in government. Citizens do too.53 But researchers disagree about
their causality. Sonja Zmerli and Ken Newton find that “robust and
statistically significant correlations [exist] between generalized
social trust, on the one hand, and confidence in political institutions
and satisfaction with democracy, on the other” in twenty-three
European countries and the United States.54 However, Bo Rothstein
and Dietlind Stolle argue that citizens make even finer distinctions,
including between legal institutions (such as the police and judges)
and political institutions (such as democracy and elected officials).
Rothstein and Stolle understand these as order institutions and
political institutions, respectively. They document “a rather strong
relationship between aggregate levels of confidence in order
institutions and generalized trust.”55 People evaluate the
trustworthiness and impartiality of order institutions at micro- and
macro-levels. Generalized trust weakens when people “experience
widespread corruption, inefficient institutions, unreliable police,

52. Id. at 85; see also id. at 112 (Our experience can affect our “basic sense of optimism
and control.”).
53. Hardin stresses this distinction and doubts a connection between the two. See
HARDIN, supra note 2, at 151.
54. Sonja Zmerli & Ken Newton, Social Trust and Attitudes Toward Democracy, 72 PUB.
OP. Q. 706, 706 (2008).
55. Bo Rothstein & Dietlind Stolle, The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory
of Generalized Trust, 40 COMPAR. POL. 441, 450 (2008) (emphasis added).
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and arbitrariness and bias of courts.”56 However, Rothstein and
Stolle find that “there is no relationship between political
institutions with elected office and generalized trust at the
aggregate level.”57 Generalized trust depends on trust in the police
and the courts, not trust in politicians.
Following Rothstein and Stolle, we can distinguish three types
of trust: social, legal, and political. Social trust is by now familiar.
Legal trust is trust in order institutions such as law enforcement
and the courts. Political trust is placed in institutions directly
affected by the political process. In particular, political trust is
placed in government officials: elected officials, political parties and
their leadership, and members of the civil service. Social trust,
recall, is trust placed by most people in all or most of other
members of society. Political trust is a subset of social trust: it is
trust in (some set of) government officials who are members of
society generally.
Political trust involves relying on government officials to follow
what I call an institutional rule. Institutional rules are norms backed
by empirical and normative expectations that constitute social
institutions and specify their aims. Institutional rules differ from
other moral rules because they are tied to the public purposes of
social institutions. The rules specify the function of the institution
and how to execute that function appropriately. Institutional rules
are social norms that facilitate some institutional purpose or value.
The institutional rules governing the American presidency require
that Presidents stay in office by winning elections rather than
through military force. Related norms require that they honor their
campaign promises. When citizens come to believe that a President
fails to follow these norms, they will trust the President less. An
institutional norm of the Environmental Protection Agency is to
protect endangered species. When the public believes the EPA has
failed to do so, trust in the EPA will fall.
Institutional rules contain morally normative expectations.
People think members of the institution morally ought to follow the
relevant norms. They believe that others believe that the
institution’s officials should follow the norms. Observed norm
violations could justify resentment, blame, and appropriate
punishment. Some theorists may be inclined to de-moralize
56. Id. at 451.
57. Id. at 450 (emphasis added).
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institutional rules. Perhaps we expect compliance for prudential, but
not moral, reasons. This is a mistake. Prudential normativity cannot
render our resentment and blame appropriate. We see political
institutions as moral agents or as comprised of moral agents.58
Institutional rules relate to the publicly recognized purposes of
the institutions they comprise. Political trust then will involve
empirical and normative expectations that the institution regularly
achieves certain outcomes.59 Political parties should produce
particular public policies. Civil servants should help their agencies
complete their objectives honestly and within their authority. When
civil servants fail, citizens resent or are indignant with them. We
will see that normative expectations apply to both the political
decision-making process and the outcomes achieved. Empirical
research shows that citizens expect government officials to be fair
and avoid corrupt decision-making procedures. Yet they should
also achieve the substantive goals of economic growth and
economic security for all. Citizens express disappointment in
officials who fail in either respect. In some cases, they resent the
officials as well.
We can now define political trust:
Political Trust: a public exhibits political trust to the extent that its
participant members generally believe that government officials are
necessary or helpful for achieving widely shared political goals and
that (most or all) government officials are generally willing and able
to do their part to achieve those goals, knowingly or unknowingly,
by following institutional rules, where moral reasons are
sufficient to motivate officials to comply with those rules.

We politically trust when we trust that government officials will
observe institutional rules and produce certain outcomes. Political
trust can be understood as trust in government. In democracies,
political trust is trust in democratically chosen officials and the
officials they appoint. So, measures of trust in democracy can be
understood along those lines.

58. Contra Paul Faulkner, Finding Trust in Government, 49 J. SOC. PHIL. 626 (2018), I
think our common understanding of democratic citizenship involves holding political
leaders responsible for outcomes (which Faulkner acknowledges) using reactive attitudes
(which Faulkner denies, in claiming that “affective trust” cannot be directed toward
government appropriately). We hold institutions responsible in a similar fashion.
59. This also means that the outcome measure is correlated with the competence
condition for interpersonal trust.
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Unlike social trust, political trust varies between different
groups, such as agencies, departments, parties, and legislatures. In
some cases, political trust may focus on a single person, such as the
President of the United States. In other cases, people may politically
trust the EPA. Political trust is always placed in one or more people
publicly seen as morally responsible agents. Even so, people may
politically mistrust leaders of an institution but trust the institution
itself. One might trust the FBI but distrust the director of the FBI.
The empirical data focuses on institutions and large groups, which
fits my definition of political trust.
It is, again, critical that political trust is moralized. Political
trust is not merely the empirical expectation that political
institutions are reliable. It includes the normative expectation that
institutions respond to moral considerations, such as shared values
and procedural rules.60 As we shall see, political trust falls when
people believe some governmental institution treats them unfairly
or unjustly. Perceived mistreatment generates the negative reactive
attitudes. I grant that one can describe some benefits of political
trust as nonmoralized political reliance. After all, nonmoral agents
like robots and psychopaths can produce good outcomes.
Nonetheless, imagine that citizens believe that all political officials
are robots or psychopaths. In that case, they cannot take the
participant stance with their rulers. This will create fear, confusion,
and alienation and will undermine trust. In contrast, trust relaxes in
a way that reliance does not since it establishes social relations with
the trustee. This makes it easier for persons to become dependent
on one another.
IV. POLITICAL TRUST: MEASUREMENT, CAUSES,
AND CONSEQUENCES
The empirical trust literature measures social trust in two ways:
through direct measures of trust, which let subjects report their own
trust levels, and through indirect measures, which attempt to
determine trust levels by observing agent decisions, behavior, and
reactions.61 Direct measures are self-report surveys, which have
60. Or officials in the institution believe they are rightfully held accountable by people
for violating institutional rules.
61. Paul C. Bauer & Markus Freitag, Measuring Trust, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST 15, 17 (Eric M. Uslaner ed., 2018).
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been around since the early 1940s. They begin with what I will call
the standard trust question, which the General Social Survey (GSS)
phrases as follows: “Generally speaking, would you say that most
people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with
people?”62 Some new surveys include “wallet” questions, which
begin “If you lost a wallet or purse that contained two hundred
dollars, how likely is it to be returned with the money in it if it
was found by . . .” and then specify different groups.63 Today,
researchers use modified versions of these questions.64 In many
cases, researchers formulate an overall social trust index from
these questions.
Empirical researchers understand political trust as including
trust in government or trust in democracy. But political trust also
includes trust groups like the civil service, the legislature, and
elected officials.65 Direct measures of political trust began in the
1960s with questions like, “Using this card, please tell me on a score
of 0–10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I
read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10
means you have complete trust.”66 One of these institutions is the
federal government. Surveys distinguish it from other groups with
the following language: “People have different ideas about the
government in Washington. These ideas don’t refer to Democrats
or Republicans in particular, but just to the government in general.
We want to see how you feel about these ideas. For example, . . .”67
Today, measures of political trust draw on the World Values
Survey and the American National Election Survey. Often these
questionnaires contain few questions with limited responses. More
recent surveys ask a larger number of questions with up to an 11-point
scale, yielding richer data. Sometimes they challenge older
empirical results.68 Studies of political trust might end up
appealing to somewhat different conceptions of political trust.

62. M. Kent Jennings & Laura Stoker, Social Trust and Civic Engagement Across Time and
Generations, 39 ACTA POLITICA 342, 350 (2004).
63. Bauer & Freitag, supra note 61, at 19.
64. Id. at 18.
65. Pippa Norris, The Conceptual Framework of Political Support, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 19–32.
66. Bauer & Freitag, supra note 61, at 17.
67. Id.
68. Sofie Marien, The Measurement Equivalence of Political Trust, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 89–103.
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Yet we still have reason to think that surveys approximate one
underlying construct.69
Many readers, philosophers in particular, will worry that these
questions are too vague. Perhaps people have different views about
who counts as “most people.” However, generalized trust is stable
across a wide variety of contexts. Examples include across
cultures70 and within different radii of groups trusted.71
Researchers typically claim that these measures indicate some
stable, society-wide attitude. Individuals think that they can rely
upon others to behave ethically. The same goes for political trust.
In the 1960s, researchers began to study game-theoretic
behavior in laboratory settings. Some economists use these studies
to build indirect measures of trust from trust games. The classic
trust game resembles the ultimatum game. In the canonical lab
experiment, researchers randomly pair subjects with one another.
They give both players an endowment and then ask the first mover
if she will send part of her endowment to the second mover.
Researchers offer to triple whatever the first mover sends to the
second mover. They then ask the second mover how much he or
she wants to return to the first mover. When the second mover
finishes this task, the researchers pay the players, ending the
experiment. In these games, players do not know each other. They
are paid privately. Trust games have prisoner’s dilemma payoffs
but are played in sequence.72
Accordingly, the second mover has no incentive to return part
of her endowment to the first mover. The first mover can infer this
and so should send nothing, according to basic strategic reasoning.
But researchers find that first movers send money and second
movers return some of their gains.73 Their behaviors thus appear to
exhibit trust and trustworthiness respectively. The first mover
exhibits trust: trusting the second mover means believing that the
second mover will return some of the endowment. The second

69. Id. at 98.
70. Tim Reeskens & Marc Hooghe, Cross-Cultural Measurement Equivalence of Generalized
Trust. Evidence from the European Social Survey (2002 and 2004), 85 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 515,
530 (2008).
71. Jan Delhey, Kenneth Newton & Christian Welzel, How General Is Trust In “Most
People”? Solving the Radius of Trust Problem, 76 AM. SOCIO. REV. 786, 786 (2011).
72. Rick K. Wilson, Trust Experiments, Trust Games, and Surveys, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 61, at 1, 3.
73. Id.
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mover exhibits trustworthiness: she doesn’t have to return part of
her gains, but she probably does so to be fair.
In some cases, trust games involve multiple parties, and so ask
players to trust multiple people to act cooperatively.
Using trust games to indirectly gauge trust and trustworthiness
faces a considerable challenge. Desires other than trust may
motivate cooperative behavior, such as concerns with efficiency,
reciprocity, and altruism.74 But many think behavioral measures of
trust beat the survey measures, as we will see below.
The direct and indirect measures of social and political trust
may not satisfy philosophers. Even so, my account of social trust
fits the literature. The standard trust question and its newer
supplements evoke reliance, expectations, and moral behavior, like
playing fair. The trust game invokes similar ideas. Both the direct
and indirect measures depend on normative expectations about
proper behavior. They arguably invite the negative reactive
attitudes when trust is low. In addition, Marc Cohen’s account of
social trust also parallels the empirical trust literature.75 On Cohen’s
account, we cannot define social trust through expectations alone;
trust requires that the truster depend on the trustee. Moreover, we
should characterize social trust in terms of obligations. A socially
trusts B to act “in accordance with some (specified) general or
background moral obligation, where A can assume that B is
committed to acting in that way because of the character of the
obligation.”76 Accounts of social trust should appeal to
“fundamental constitutive practices that make a social order
possible.”77 Moral rules plainly constitute the practices that enable
social orders to form and function. My account of social trust
includes normative expectations. It should fit definitions of social
trust in the empirical literature.
Admittedly, my conception of political trust diverges the
conceptions of political trust found in the empirical literature. The
literature often measures satisfaction with government and
democracy. Surveys often fail to make the moralized element of
political trust explicit. However, when citizens are asked whether
74. Id. at 4. See also James C. Cox, How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity, 46 GAMES
& ECON. BEHAV. 260–81 (2004).
75. Marc A. Cohen, Alternative Conceptions of Generalized Trust (and the Foundations of
the Social Order), 46 J. SOC. PHIL. 463, 465 (2015).
76. Id. at 475.
77. Id.
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they trust the government, researchers invite them to make moral
judgments. One example involves judging whether governments
obey fair procedures and produce promised results. Suppose
citizens think institutions generate good outcomes because officials
care about them. Or perhaps they think officials possess good
character and behave ethically. In those cases, citizens should
increase their political trust. Consequently, when citizens are
surveyed about trusting government officials, their answers should
reflect their political trust. When surveys measure satisfaction,
matters become more complicated. Presumably, trust and
satisfaction are related. High political trusters are more satisfied
with government than low trusters.
Some researchers criticize survey measures of trust based on
laboratory experiments: direct and indirect measures of trust do not
always coincide. Trust game experiments suggest a “lack of . . .
close correlation between behavior and questionnaire responses.”78
Those who claim that they are high trusters are not more likely to
cooperate in micro-level trust games.79 Worrisomely, “the three
questions most often used in survey research to measure general
trust were not predictive of the likelihood that subjects will trust
each other even in a repeated setting,” such that the subjects may
be “responding in a glib manner to this survey instrument.”80 In a
recent survey of the self-report measures, Rick Wilson
documents research refuting correlations between the two
measures. This is a serious concern: people may say that they
trust others but act otherwise.81
Nevertheless, some authors find that “specific questions about
past experiences of being trusted or extending trust in the past”
correlate with trusting behavior.82 Answers to these survey
questions “were positively related to trustworthy, if not trusting,
behavior.”83 Since trust is often driven by the observation of
trustworthy behavior, showing that highly trusting persons are
trustworthy in the lab suggests the presence of mutual trust. More

78. T.K. Ahn, Elinor Ostrom, David Schmidt & James Walker, Trust in Two-Person
Games: Game Structures and Linkages, in TRUST AND RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS
FOR EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH 323, 345 (Elinor Olstrom & James Walker eds., 2003).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Wilson, supra note 72, at 15.
82. Ahn et al., supra note 78, at 345.
83. Id.
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directly, new work finds a correlation between self-report measures
of trust and trust game behavior. The correlation arises when trust
games have sizeable financial payoffs. Sapienza and colleagues
claim survey measures and trust game behaviors increasingly
correlate as payoffs rise.84 And Wilson claims that “when the
appropriate controls are put into place (at least among students in
the lab), it appears that the first mover’s behavior and the [standard
trust question] are correlated.”85 So the trust game data probably
does not undercut the survey data.
Direct measures of trust engage people in ordinary social
contexts. Indirect measures take place in the laboratory. The setting
may lead participants to view their actions as distinct from trust in
strangers or institutions. So even if trust game data and survey data
conflict, we need not favor the lab. Further, the survey measures
are cross-cultural. They allow us to compare trust between different
cultures and different types of institutions. The direct measures
have more variety and depth than the trust game data. Based on the
foregoing, I focus on direct measures of social and political trust.
But given the tension, we should use the survey data cautiously.
We now have an empirically and intuitively respectable
account of political trust. Now consider what the survey data
suggests about the causes and consequences of social and
political trust.86
A central question in the social trust literature concerns
“whether social trust is . . . a deeply held disposition socialized
early in life that remains relatively immune to subsequent
experiences or . . . an impressionable outlook shaped continuously
throughout life by an individual’s experience.”87 Thus, cultural
factors fix individuals’ social trust, such as upbringing, family, and
broader cultural experiences; these factors lock trust levels from an
early age. We can all this the culturalist approach. The contrasting
84. See Paola Sapienza, Anna Toldra-Simats & Luigi Zingales, Understanding Trust, 123
ECON. J. 1313, (2013).
85. Wilson, supra note 72, at 8.
86. Setting aside personality type. For a discussion, see Matthew Cawvey, Matthew
Hayes, Damarys Canache & Jeffery J. Mondak, Biological and Psychological Influences on
Interpersonal and Political Trust, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST,
supra note 61, at 119, 127.
87. Peter Thisted Dinesen & Kim Mannemar Sønderskov, Ethnic Diversity and Social
Trust: A Critical Review of the Literature and Suggestions for a Research Agenda, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 61, at 175, 176.
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institutionalist approach claims that trust is determined by
observations and experience of trustworthiness in institutional
settings. There is evidence for both the culturalist and the
institutionalist positions. The culturalist approach draws on the fact
that national social trust levels are remarkably stable over time.
Indeed, levels remain stable despite significant social and political
change. Social trust may not be affected by a change in perceived
trustworthiness in the population. Social trust will have
nonrational determinants.88 But differences in institution behavior
affect the trust levels of persons from the same culture.89
Ethnic diversity is often thought to reduce social trust, though
“meta-analyses show substantial variation in the relationship
between ethnic diversity and social trust.”90 Ethnic diversity
negatively affects trust, but usually due to lack of contact and a
segregation effect.91 Interactions with others “indicate that the
estimated effect of diversity becomes less negative/more positive
under contact.”92 Still, overall, Dinesen and Sønderskov argue that
“exercising great caution, we do believe it is fair to say that the main
finding from the literature is a negative—albeit not always
significant—relationship between ethnic diversity and social trust,”
though there’s “not really a consensus.”93
Political trust varies more than social trust. It responds to
citizens’ evaluations of the success of those institutions in pursuing
their publicly recognized aims. The prime cross-time institutional
causes of political trust are economic performance and corruption.94
When people feel that their individual economic performance is
strong, they trust more. When they observe political corruption,
they trust less.95 Thus, when citizens observe that officials follow
political norms, this will tend to increase political trust in those
officials. This is akin to how obeying shared norms of citizenship

88. Id.
89. See John Helliwell, Shun Wang & Jinwen Xu, How Durable Are Social Norms?
Immigrant Trust and Generosity in 132 Countries, 128 SOC. INDICATORS RSCH. 201-219, (2016).
90. Dinesen & Sønderskov, supra note 87, at 179.
91. Id. at 178–79.
92. Id. at 183.
93. Id. at 196–97.
94. Tom W.G. van der Meer & Sonja Zmerli, The Deeply Rooted Concern with Political
Trust, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 1, 7.
95. Id.
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raises trust in other citizens.96 In particular, when citizens think
officials treat them fairly, their political trust will increase.97
Effective social insurance also seems to increase political trust,
as “the more positively an individual evaluates the state of social
protection in the country, the higher the satisfaction with
democracy.”98 Political trust often decreases in response to major
economic crises and the fear of declining income.99 Economic
inequality appears to decrease political trust, probably because
inequality is seen as a sign of corruption. Uslaner argues that
“[i]nequality leads people to believe that leaders listen far more to
the rich than to others in society.”100 Perceived unfairness reduces
trust in government. Importantly, small acts of “petty”
corruption don’t decrease political trust much, though this does
not hold if people observe the police or the courts receiving gift
payments.101 But “grand” corruption—major events observed by
the public—can greatly decrease political trust.102
While ethnic diversity doesn’t seem to decrease social trust
across all contexts, it may decrease political trust.103 Participating in
civil associations seems to increase political trust, though it is not
clear why.104 Mass media affects political trust, but the effect is more
modest and less negative than one might expect.105 Education helps
citizens track the behavior of governments. It can create political

96. Jan van Deth, Compliance, Trust, and Norms of Citizenship, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 212, 224.
97. Marcia Grimes, Procedural Fairness and Political Trust, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL
TRUST, supra note 1, at 256, 256.
98. Staffan Kumlin & Alte Haugsgjerd, The Welfare State and Political Trust: Bringing
Performance Back In, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 285, 289.
99. Id.
100. Eric M. Uslaner, Political Trust, Corruption, and Inequality, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 302, 302.
101. Id. at 308.
102. Id.
103. Lauren McLaren, Immigration, Ethnic Diversity and Political Trust, in HANDBOOK ON
POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 316, 320. For an important analysis of the trust-diversity
relationship, see Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the TwentyFirst Century, 30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 137–74 (2007).
104. Christopher Liu & Dietlind Stolle, Social Capital, Civic Culture and Political Trust, in
HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 338, 338–39. For a classic analysis of the
trust-association connection, see ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND
REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2001).
105. See Ken Newton, Political Trust and the Mass Media, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL
TRUST, supra note 1, at 353, 353.
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trust when political performance is strong and lower political trust
when political performance falters.106
Social trust increases political trust, though the causal
connection may be indirect. Social trust may increase economic
growth, improving personal economic performance, and political
trust in turn.107
We need reasonably high political trust for a number of reasons.
Marc Hetherington argues that political trust gives leaders the
confidence they need to enact programs that improve lives. Less
informed citizens may not understand how the programs work.
Low trusters will not trust leaders to enact policies that work for
reasons voters cannot easily grasp.108 Rothstein argues that
countries with higher political trust have higher quality
government. That leads government to spend more on social
policies and improve other outcomes.109 Political distrust may,
therefore, make it harder for governments to function. Distrust
deprives citizens of better policy.
On the other hand, democracies depend on a degree of distrust
in political officials and political parties.110 So how much political
trust is optimal? To answer this question, we need to distinguish
between trust in democracy and trust in specific parties and
officials. Maybe people should trust democratic institutions but
remain somewhat skeptical of prominent and influential political
officials.111 However, again, if citizens are too mistrustful, political
officials may lose their ability to enact unpopular but good policies.
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL TRUST FOR POLITICAL AND

106. Quinton Mayne & Armen Hakhverdian, Education, Socialization, and Political Trust,
in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 176, 181.
107. See Sonja Zmerli & Ken Newton, Objects of Political and Social Trust: Scales and
Hierarchies, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 104, 105.
108. See MARC J. HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS: DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST
AND THE DEMISE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (2005).
109. See generally BO ROTHSTEIN, THE QUALITY OF GOVERNMENT: CORRUPTION, SOCIAL
TRUST, AND INEQUALITY IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (2011). Political trust can cause
politicians to be trustworthy, engendering further trust in turn.
110. See Mark E. Warren, What Kinds of Trust Does a Democracy Need? Trust from the
Perspective of Democratic Theory, in HANDBOOK ON POLITICAL TRUST, supra note 1, at 33.
111. We may want, for instance, most members of political institutions to be
trustworthy so that they can keep inherently less trustworthy politicians in check.
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LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
The significance of political trust for political and legal
philosophy is manifest: political trust helps political institutions
function effectively. Political trust promotes the public good
because it improves government effectiveness and produces
positive social outcomes. Moreover, political trust is part of the
reason we have certain kinds of institutions.
We should want more political trust. If so, we should favor
familiar liberal democratic institutions, along with a market
economy and considerable social supports.
With a better grasp on the concept, causes, and consequences of
political trust, we better follow the literatures in multiples fields as
they develop. With good fortune, interdisciplinary trust research
can unlock some of the most pressing questions of our time: how
can nations build political trust once it has been lost? Perhaps
political polarization and political distrust causally connect. If so, can
we use trust to reduce excessive political polarization? With a clearer
idea of political trust in hand, we can make progress on pressing
political matters. Perhaps we can resolve ongoing conflicts within the
United States related to election integrity and COVID-19 containment.
If we step back from current challenges—as important as they
are—we can also see how understanding political trust advances
political philosophy. Political trust advances a large sub-field in
contemporary political philosophy: the public reason literature.
Political trust is also a critical ingredient of political stability,
including when stability is driven by the moral motivations of
citizens.112 In one respect, political trust is a precondition for
persons to rationally and reasonably comply with political
institutions. Compliance depends on trusting others to comply in
response to our compliance. Without political trust, citizens will
doubt that others act reciprocally. This reduces the incentive for
people to be trustworthy, which will lower trust further.
Political trust is also significant for social contract theory.
Political trust is one of the outcomes that we want a social contract
theory to rationalize. We want a shared agreement to give persons
good reason to trust one another. A society can enjoy the benefits
of political trust in a stable, predictable fashion. Furthermore, if the
institutions we jointly authorize somehow undermine our political

112. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xl (2d ed. 2005).
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trust, a social agreement to follow the directives of these
institutions cannot survive for long. When political officials breach
public trust, our reasons to trust them and be trustworthy in
obeying them weaken. In this way, studying political trust helps
establish the success conditions for a social contract.
Political trust is especially important for contract theories that
appeal to public reason. On these accounts, rules achieve
justification when shared or public reasons vindicate them.
Specifically, public reasons justify the rules by helping us see why
obeying the rule is morally required.113 Then, when people follow
their public reasons, they provide others with reasons to trust them.
We all have moral reasons of our own to comply with shared legal
and constitutional rules. Public compliance with public reasons
then illustrates that people support shared institutions, evincing
trustworthiness. A disposition to comply with rules for public
reasons can therefore form and preserve political trust.
Understanding political trust helps us to understand the
rationale for a society’s social contract. It also helps us see why
social contract theory offers a compelling approach to social life.
Understanding political trust, then, has an immediate payoff in
terms of analyzing and addressing current political problems. But
it also advances the historical aims of political philosophy.

113. See id. at 212–54.
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